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Abstract  
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over one’s actions, and their consequences.  It 
involves both predictive processes linked to action control, and retrospective “sense-making” 
causal inferences. Schizophrenia has been associated with impaired predictive processing, but 
the underlying mechanisms that impair patients’ sense of agency remain unclear. We 
introduce a new, “prospective” aspect of agency and show that subliminally priming an 
action not only influences response times, but also influences reported sense of agency over 
subsequent action outcomes. This effect of priming was associated with altered connectivity 
between frontal areas and the angular gyrus. The effects on response times and on frontal 
action selection mechanisms were similar in patients with schizophrenia and in healthy 
volunteers. However, patients showed no effects of priming on sense of agency, no priming-
related activation of angular gyrus, and no priming-related changes in fronto-parietal 
connectivity. We suggest angular gyrus activation reflects the experiences of agency, or non-
agency, in part by processing action selection signals generated in the frontal lobes. The 
altered action awareness that characterises schizophrenia may be due to impaired 
communication between these areas. 
Keywords: selection fluency; agency; angular gyrus; dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex; 
schizophrenia. 
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Introduction 
The sense of agency refers to the feeling that one controls one’s own actions, and, through 
them, events in the external world. It is considered a key component for understanding the 
self in health and disease.  
Disordered sense of agency is a characteristic feature of psychotic syndromes (Frith, 
1992; Nelson et al., 2013a, 2013b). The common feature of these experiences – succinctly 
captured by the term Ichstörungen (“self-disturbance”) coined by the early 20th century 
Heidelberg School of psychiatry in Germany (Jaspers, 1913; Gruhle, 1929; Spitzer, 1988) – is 
a loss or disturbance of experienced control over one’s own actions, emotions and cognitions 
(Jeannerod, 2009; Heinz et al., 2012; Vosgerau and Voss, 2013). Schneider (1942, 1958) 
argued that these self-disturbances were “highly specific for schizophrenia” and classified 
them along with some types of delusions or hallucinations, as “first rank symptoms” (FRS). 
There is still a wide consensus that such disturbances of the “mineness of experience” 
constitute a key feature of psychosis, and a fundamental alteration of core aspects of the self 
(Sass and Parnas, 2003; Mishara et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the pathognomonic nature of 
FRS has been questioned by some recent studies (Peralta et al., 1999; Ihara et al., 2009) and 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has removed reference to FRS from the new 
version of the DSM-5 (Tandon et al., 2013; Heinz, Voss et al., 2016) – perhaps because of the 
difficulties of relating alterations of sense of agency to quantitative measurements and to 
specific neurobiological mechanisms. However, a rigorous scientific account of sense of 
agency could have genuine clinical value, since disturbances of the “basic self”, such as 
altered awareness of action, are a phenotypic trait marker of schizophrenia. In principle, 
therefore, detailed assessment of sense of agency could be used to identify prodromal stages 
of the disease (e.g., Nelson et al., 2009; Hauser et al., 2010). 
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Sense of agency involves an interplay between predictions based on internal processing 
of current action control signals, and retrospective inferences, based on sensory feedback, 
about the causes of events (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009; Haggard and Chambon, 2012; 
Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Voss, et al., 2013). Accordingly, disturbances of self-
agency in schizophrenia have been linked to deficits in internal monitoring processes in 
general (e.g. Malenka et al., 1982; Franck et al., 2001; Fourneret et al., 2002; Lindner et al., 
2005) and, more specifically, to a failure to predict future events, such as one’s own 
impending actions and their consequences (Frith et al., 200; Blakemore et al., 2002; Shergill 
et al., 2005). Individuals suffering from schizophrenia seem to compensate for such 
prediction deficits by more strongly weighting afferent information about action outcomes, 
reflecting an increased reliance on retrospective cues to agency (Voss et al., 2010; Synofzik 
et al., 2010; Chambon et al., 2011, Werner et al., 2014). 
This interplay between prospective and retrospective information has often been 
interpreted using comparator models of motor control (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, et al., 
2002). In these models, an efference copy of motor commands is sent to an internal predictor, 
that predicts the likely outcome of the motor command. These predictions could include both 
the movements or states of one’s own body, and also the external outcomes of one’s own 
actions. A comparator node then compares afferent inputs to these predictions, generating a 
prediction error. It has been suggested that sense of agency is felt with respect to an event 
when predictions and afferent signals cancel, leaving no prediction error at the output of the 
comparator. Clearly, these models contain at least two key signals relevant to sense of 
agency. The first of these is the efference copy itself, which signals that a specific action will 
occur. The second is the re-afference that an action or its outcome has actually occurred. The 
efferent signal necessarily precedes the action, and can therefore be called prospective, while 
the re-afferent signal is necessarily delayed by feedback conduction delays, and is therefore 
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retrospective. Thus, comparator models compute sense of agency by fusing both prospective 
and retrospective signals. Importantly, the comparator itself cannot compute until re-afferent 
signals are available, so the final output of the model is, in this sense, always retrospective. 
Recent studies have focussed on the retrospective aspects of the comparator model. For 
example, cancelling sensory information about action outcomes against the predictions of an 
internal model based on efference copy allows events to be attributed to one’s own action or 
not (Timm et al., 2014). Models that focus on the link between actions and their outcomes, 
such as the comparator model, can be taken as emphasising a retrospective view of sense of 
agency. In contrast, models that focus on earlier stages of the action processing chain, such as 
action selection, emphasise a prospective view. On the retrospective view, agency is strongly 
dependent on how predictable the effect of action is, and hence on minimizing prediction 
error between actual and predicted effect (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, et al., 2002). In contrast, 
the prospective view does not make any claim about predictability of effect, and does not 
require the actual effect of action to be known for the computation of sense of control to 
begin. Rather, the prospective view assumes that signals arising during selection and prior to 
execution can influence sense of control, in addition to re-afferent or predicted information 
about action outcomes (e.g., Wenke et al., 2010). Several studies have suggested that signals 
experienced at the critical moment of choice are relevant to the experience of control (e.g., 
Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon et al., 2013; Stenner et al., 2014; Sidarus et al., 2014). The 
contribution of these early signals does however not rule out a role for efference-based 
internal models, neither does it imply that action effects are irrelevant to sense of agency. 
Normally, both prospective and retrospective information relevant to agency are available. A 
robust and reliable sense of agency presumably requires optimally combining both 
prospective and retrospective components. 
Here we describe a specific prospective process that contributes to sense of agency, 
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namely the process of selecting between action alternatives. Since action selection necessarily 
precedes dispatch of the efferent motor command, this component of agency would clearly be 
prospective. We used fMRI to identify the brain circuits that process the action selection 
signal and investigate its influence on sense of agency. In a group of patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, we demonstrate for the first time how this mechanism is altered in psychosis. 
We used subliminal priming to selectively influence action selection. Subliminally 
priming people regarding which of two actions to make causes changes in response time 
(Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003). Primes can facilitate or impair selection of the appropriate 
action in response to a subsequent cue, or can bias free selection. Interestingly, compatible 
primes also induce a stronger feeling of control over an external outcome of action (Wenke et 
al., 2010), compared to incompatible primes. Crucially, this effect of subliminal priming on 
sense of control occurs even when there is no doubt about the authorship of the action and of 
the resulting outcome, or even when the prime is unrelated to the outcome of the action 
(Chambon and Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013). This suggests that the processes of 
action selection contribute to sense of agency. Since action selection necessarily precedes 
action execution, this would constitute a prospective component of sense of agency. 
Sixteen healthy adults and sixteen individuals with schizophrenia participated in our 
study. Different response types were used to disentangle the effect of action selection 
processing (e.g., fluent vs. dysfluent) from the effect of the generative source of action (e.g., 
external vs. internal) (e.g., Marcel, 2003). While it has been previously shown that action 
selection processes make a contribution to subjective sense of control (e.g., Wenke et al., 
2010), it remains unclear whether different sources of action generation could also contribute. 
Thus, in the following experiment, subliminal arrow primes were used to influence either 
cued-choice or free-choice keypress responses to a subsequent left, right or double-headed 
arrow cue. Participants’ responses caused a colour to appear, after a variable delay. 
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Participants then judged how much control they felt over this visual outcome of their action. 
Crucially, the colour shown was not related to the prime alone. Rather, one set of colours was 
shown when prime and cue were compatible with the subsequent target, and another set when 
they were incompatible. Likewise, in free-choice conditions, primes could be compatible or 
incompatible with the hand used to respond. Thus, our primes manipulated the fluency of 
action selection, allowing us to investigate the prospective contribution of selection processes 
to sense of agency, in both healthy volunteers and in psychotic patients.   
 
<< Insert Fig. 1 about here >> 
 
We show that action priming had similar influences on prefrontal action selection 
processing in both volunteers and patients. Action priming further influenced sense of agency 
via connectivity with the angular gyrus, but this mechanism was absent in the psychotic 
patients. This result suggests that altered action awareness in schizophrenia could arise from 
failure to prospectively experience internal signals of selection fluency at the critical moment 
of choice, due to impaired interplay between frontal action-selection and parietal monitoring 
mechanisms. Instead, we observed a stronger reliance on retrospective cues such as the 
interval between an action and its effect, which could reflect a compensatory mechanism. 
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Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
Sixteen right-handed non-psychiatric healthy volunteers (3 females and 13 males aged 23–43 
years), and sixteen right-handed individuals with schizophrenia (5 females and 11 males aged 
24–49 years), with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were recruited to participate in the 
study. Patients and healthy volunteers were matched for handedness, age, and sex (Table 1). 
In patients, negative and positive symptoms were evaluated with the SANS (Scale for the 
Assessment of Negative symptoms, mean: 23.4, SD: 14) (Andreasen, 1983) and the SAPS 
(Scale for the Assessment of Positive symptoms, mean: 21.6, SD: 19.9) (Andreasen, 1984). 
For each patient, a “ego-disturbance” score was also computed by summing the following 
subscores from the SAPS: delusions of mind reading, thought broadcasting, thought 
insertion, thought withdrawal, somatic delusions, delusions of being controlled, ideas and 
delusions of reference. These items have been shown to constitute fundamental components 
of passivity experience, whose common feature is a perceived loss or disturbance of control 
over one’s own actions and cognitions (Jeannerod, 2009; Heinz et al., 2012). Of the 16 
schizophrenic patients, two were excluded because of: claustrophobia (1; the patient could 
not complete the test), or excessive motion (1; more than one translational displacement of 3 
mm or greater). Of the 16 comparison participants, two were also excluded because of: 
excessive motion (1; more than one translational displacement of 3 mm or greater), or high 
sensitivity to subliminal primes (1; see Results, prime-visibility test). All participants 
provided written informed consent prior to the experiment according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and were all paid €30 for their participation. The study was approved by the local 
ethics review board at the Charité University Hospital, Berlin, Germany. 
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<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
Experimental design and procedure 
The visual display was presented on a screen (display mode= 800 × 600 × 32, 60 Hz) 
positioned at the front of the magnet bore. Subjects lay supine in the scanner and viewed the 
display on a mirror positioned above them. The experiment was programmed and 
stimulations were delivered using the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, 
Albany, California, http://www.neurobs.com).  
Primes consisted of grey left- or right-pointing arrows followed by metacontrast 
masks of the same luminance (see Fig. 1). The metacontrast masks also consisted of arrows 
that either pointed to the left or the right (in cued-choice trials), or in both directions 
simultaneously (in free-choice trials). Prime and mask stimuli could appear randomly above 
or below fixation to enhance the masking effect (Vorberg et al., 2003). All stimuli appeared 
on a grey background.  
Participants made left or right keypress actions on each trial using the index fingers of 
their left and right hands, and made control ratings using all fingers of each hand, with the 
exception of thumbs. To respond to targets as to make their control judgments, participants 
used two 4-buttons response-boxes placed in their left and right hands. 
Examples of each mask stimulus (left-, right-, and double-pointing arrows) were 
presented during experimental instruction so that participants would become acquainted with 
the target stimuli. No reference was made to the existence or appearance of the primes.  
The participants’ task was to monitor, and then judge how much control they had over 
colour-effect stimuli that followed left and right keypress actions. 
Cued and free-choice trials were randomly intermixed within blocks. On cued-choice 
trials, participants pressed the left and right keys in response to left- and right-pointing arrow 
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mask cues. On free-choice trials they saw a double-pointing arrow mask, and could respond 
as they wished.  They were encouraged to avoid fixed response schedules (e.g., alternating 
between responses), and approximately balance response frequencies. In both cued and free 
trials, left or right-pointing subliminal arrows appeared before the cue (see Fig. 1).  
In half of the cued trials at random, the prime and the mask/target (and therefore also 
the manual response, assuming that participants responded correctly) were compatible, while 
on the remaining trials they were incompatible. On compatible trials, the direction of the 
prime corresponded to the direction of the mask/target, and hence signalled the same 
response. On incompatible trials, prime and mask/target pointed in different directions. On 
free trials, compatibility was defined online after the subject had responded, because the 
mask did not unambiguously signal a “correct” response. Responses were classified as prime-
compatible when participants “freely” choose the response suggested by the prime, and 
otherwise as incompatible.  
A coloured circle appeared 100, 400 or 700 ms after each response. This randomized 
jitter produced strong variations in the perceived sense of control over the colour (Haggard et 
al., 2002; Wenke et al., 2010).  The delay was orthogonal to prime-response compatibility 
manipulations. 
   Four colours were shown for prime-compatible responses (two for each hand), and 
four different colours for prime-incompatible responses. Colours were equally predictable 
across compatible and incompatible priming conditions. Specifically, the colour was 
independent of the direction indicated by both the subliminal prime and the target arrow (and 
hence independent of the keypress made by the subject), but depended only on the 
compatibility relation between the prime and the subsequent target. We reasoned that making 
the colour vary with the prime-target relation should facilitate participants in distinguishing 
between the different subjective experiences associated with fluent or dysfluent prime-
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induced action selection, and hence should provide an additional basis for perceptual 
labelling and rating of control in these conditions (see Wenke et al., 2010 for a similar 
procedure). 
 Participants reported how much control they felt they had over the colour effect by 
using a scale ranging from 1 (no control) to 8 (complete control).  
 
Timeline of experimental trials 
Each trial began with a central fixation cross which remained visible until the colour-effect 
stimulus appeared (Fig. 1). Primes were presented for 16.67 ms (i.e., one frame), followed by 
a mask after an SOA (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony) of 33.3 ms (i.e., two frames). The masks 
served as cues for motor responses.  Mask/cue duration was 250 ms. The response window 
was set to 1200 ms. If participants failed to respond within this time window, or made an 
incorrect response to the mask/target, they saw a black X instead of a coloured circle. The 
coloured patches showing action effects remained on the screen for 300 ms. After a jittered 
delay (grey background) varying from 2 to 4 s, a rating scale appeared for 1500 ms, allowing 
the participant to judge the level of control she felt over the colour patch. Once the participant 
made her control judgment, the rating scale was replaced by a fixation cross until the end of 
the 1500 ms response window. The fixation cross was shown for a 3000 ms inter-trial 
interval. 
Each block ended with a pause lasting 30 s. The experiment consisted of four blocks 
of 48 trials each. When an error occurred in a trial, the corresponding trial was repeated at the 
end of each block (up to 10 error trials per block). Repeating error trials ensured that all 
colours were seen equally often, even if participants made response errors.  
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Behavioural analyses 
Control ratings were analysed using 2 × 2 × 3 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs with prime-
target compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) and type of choice (cued vs. free) and 
action-effect interval (AEI) (short vs. medium vs. long) as within-subjects factors, and group 
(healthy volunteers vs. patients) as a between-subjects factor. Hits on cued-choice trials, and 
selection bias (% of prime-compatible responses) on free-choice trials were analysed 
separately using two 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs with prime-target compatibility 
(compatible vs. incompatible) as a within-subjects factor, and group (healthy volunteers vs. 
patients) as a between-subjects factor. For all analyses, a p < 0.05 was taken as the criterion 
for significance. 
 
Data acquisition and preprocessing 
Images were collected using a Siemens 3.0 T Magnetom Trio whole-body scanner.  We 
acquired 290 T2*-weighted echo-planar functional volume per participant over each run. 
Each volume comprised 33 coronal slices acquired continuously  (TR=2000ms, TE=30ms; 
flip angle=78°, thickness: 3 mm, 23% gap; in-plane matrix size: 64 ×  64; voxel size: 3 ×  3 
×  3 mm3) were acquired per volume. A high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image (TR 
= 2500 ms; TE = 4.77ms; resolution: 1×1×1 mm3; matrix size: 256 ×  256) was collected for 
each subject. Head motions were minimized using foam padding and headphones with 
earplugs were used to dampen the scanner noise. 
fMRI data were pre-processed and analysed using using SPM5 software (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, UK, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The first five volumes of each run were removed to allow 
for T1 equilibrium effects. All functional volumes were realigned using a six-parameters 
rigid body transformation to correct for head motions. Functional and structural images were 
coregistered, and normalized into a standard MNI space (Montreal Neurological Institute 
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template). Functional data were then smoothed with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-maximum 
Gaussian kernel, and processed using a 128s high-pass filter.  
We included realignment parameters in all statistical analyses as covariates to model 
out potential non-linear motion-related artifacts (second degree polynomial expansion). Then, 
we checked data for electronic, and rapid-movements artifacts using the ArtRepair toolbox 
(http://cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/human-brain-project/artrepair-software.html). Artifacted 
volumes were substituted by linear interpolation between contiguous volumes, deweighted 
and explicitly modelled in the following statistical analyses. Estimated head movements were 
small compared to voxel size (<1 mm), and less than 5% of the volumes were excluded due 
to rapid head movements (>1.5mm/s). 
 
fMRI data analyses 
Whole-brain statistical parametric analyses were performed using a two-stage random-effect 
approach. We estimated independently the model parameters from each subject’s dataset and 
each group of participant, and then made population inferences using the parameter inter-
subject variance. Regressors of interest were constructed by convolving functions 
representing the events with the canonical hemodynamic response function.  
For compatible and incompatible conditions of cued and free trials, we defined the 
‘action selection’ phase as the interval between prime onset and participant’s response to the 
mask/target stimulus, and the ‘control judgment’ phase as the period from the scale onset to 
participant’s rating of their level of control (see Fig. 1). Thus, four distinct event-related 
regressors modelled correct (cued and free) trials associated with compatible and 
incompatible conditions at both time of action selection and control judgment. 
Each participant’s control ratings in each compatibility condition were divided into 
tertiles to define low, medium, and high levels of experienced control (see Supplementary 
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Methods for details). We entered the tertiles into the model (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high 
level of experienced control) to identify brain regions in which the BOLD signal recorded at 
(1) time of action selection, and (2) time of control judgment, was modulated by judgments 
of control. We examined regression coefficients separately for compatible and incompatible 
conditions of cued and free trials. Additional event-related regressors were used to model and 
thus remove effects of participants’ motor response and RTs in both compatible and 
incompatible conditions (see Supplementary Methods and Fig. S1). Finally, scanning series 
and head motion parameters estimates (translation in x,y,z; roll, pitch, yaw) were included as 
covariates of no interest in the design matrix.  
Regression parameters were estimated in every voxel for each subject, and then 
parameter estimates were entered in a between-subject, random-effect analysis to obtain 
statistical parametric maps. Factorial ANOVAs with group (healthy volunteers vs. patients) 
as a between-subjects factor, and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as a within-
subjects factor, compared both groups in cued and free trials separately, either at time of 
action selection or at time of control judgment. We identified brain activations showing 
significant contrasts of parameter estimates with a voxel-wise (P < 0.001, uncorrected) and 
cluster-wise (P < 0.05, uncorrected) significance threshold (minimum cluster size 10 voxels).  
 
Results 
 
Behavioral performance: Prime-visibility test   
Following the main experiment, each group of participants additionally performed a direct 
assessment of prime visibility inside the scanner (see Supplementary Methods, “Prime-
visibility test”). One volunteer was excluded from both behavioural and fMRI analyses 
because her d′ in free-choice trials of the prime visibility test was relatively high (0.57, more 
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than one standard deviation above the mean). For all remaining participants, signal detection 
analyses confirmed that primes were below the threshold of awareness, with mean d′ not 
significantly different from zero in both cued-choice (volunteers: mean d′= 0.045 ± 0.17, p = 
0.33; patients: mean d′= 0.056 ± 0.16, p = 0.22) and free-choice trials (volunteers: mean d′= -
0.076 ± 0.21, p = 0.18; patients: mean d′= -0.062 ± 0.2, p = 0.26). 
 
Behavioural data: action priming effects on motor response times, and control 
ratings 
Both groups responded faster to compatible than incompatible primes (main effect of 
compatibility: F(1,26)=10.51, p=0.003), and faster on cued trials than on free trials (main 
effect of choice: F(1,26)=6.96, p=0.014) (Fig. S2). On free trials, participants selected prime-
compatible responses significantly more often than prime-incompatible responses (main 
effect of compatibility: F(1,26)=18.87, p=0.008). There were no group main effects or 
interactions with group (all p’s>0.59) (Fig. S3).  Error rates in cued choice trials were 
unaffected by compatibility (F(1,26)=2.04, p=0.16) and we found no interaction effect 
between compatibility and group (F(1,26)=0.01, p=0.92) (Fig. S4).  
As expected, there was a main effect of compatibility on control ratings: participants 
experienced higher levels of control over action effects following compatible prime-target 
associations (F(1,26)=7.78, p=0.01, ,  = 0.23), consistent with previous findings (e.g., 
Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013). More importantly, 
we found a significant interaction effect between compatibility and group (F(1,26)=9.32, 
p=0.005, ,  = 0.26). This arose because volunteers experienced greater control on 
compatible relative to incompatible trials, whereas patients with schizophrenia did not (see 
Fig. 2). There was a significant main effect of the action-effect interval (AEI) (F(2,52) = 
2
pη
2
pη
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181.17, p < 0.001, ,  = 0.87), with participants experiencing higher control for short AEI 
(posthoc tests: short vs. medium, medium vs. long, all p’s < 0.001). Importantly, we found a 
significant AEI-by-Group interaction effect (F(2,52) = 15.73, p < 0.001, ,  = 0.37), with 
individuals with schizophrenia feeling higher sense of control for short AEI (posthoc test: p < 
0.001) but lower sense of control for long AEI (posthoc test: p = 0.001) relative to 
comparison participants (Supplementary Information, Figure S5). There was no other 
significant interaction effects between AEI and Choice and/or Compatibility factors (all 
F’s(2,52) < 0.49, all p’s > 0.61). Finally, we found no significant main effect of Choice (cued 
vs. free: F(1,26) = 0.77, p = 0.38) and no interaction effect between Choice and any other 
factors (all F’s(1-2,26-52) < 1.16, all p’s > 0.29). 
Importantly, the main effect of compatibility gave a smaller effect size than the main 
effect of action-effect interval (  = 0.23 vs. 0.87, respectively). However, the interaction 
with group gave similar effect sizes (Compatibility-by-Group:  = 0.26 AEI-by-Group:  
= 0.37). 
 
<< Insert Fig. 2 about here >> 
 
We next computed regressions to investigate whether control ratings could simply 
reflect monitoring of reaction times. For each participant, we predicted control ratings on 
each trial from reaction time (βRT), prime compatibility βprime and their interaction (βRT*prime). 
We then tested beta values across individuals against zero. In healthy volunteers, prime type 
significantly predicted the control rating (one-sample t-test: t(1, 13) = -4.22, p = 0.001), but 
there was no significant relationship with reaction times (t(1, 13) = -1.64, p = 0.12), and no 
influence of the interaction term β (t(1, 13) = 1.68, p = 0.11). In patients, control ratings were 
2
pη
2
pη
2
pη
2
pη
2
pη
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unrelated to primes (one-sample t-test: t(1, 13) = 0.18, p = 0.68), reaction times (t(1, 13) = 
0.96, p = 0.35), and their interaction β (t(1, 13) = 1.15, p = 0.27). 
 
Main effect of action selection  
Regions involved in action selection were identified by contrasting compatible and 
incompatible trials, across both cued and free trials (main effect of compatibility). In order to 
identify pure effects of action selection, independent of sense of control, we excluded regions 
which varied with sense of control at time of action selection. To do so, we exclusively 
masked activations showing a main effect of compatibility (see below) with a parametric 
contrast of {compatible ×  control} versus {incompatible ×  control}, or {incompatible ×  
control} versus {compatible ×  control}, as appropriate. This contrast identifies regions 
involved in processing objective fluency (compatible condition) or dysfluency (incompatible 
condition) of action selection, but whose activity was independent of subjective control 
experienced by participants (see Chambon et al., 2013, for a similar procedure).   
In the cued-choice condition, a main effect of compatibility was found in bilateral 
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Specifically, incompatible trials triggered significant 
deactivation in left (x, y, z = –42, 28, 27, Z = 5.74) and right dlPFC (x, y, z = 46, 36, 26, Z = 
5.07) relative to baseline and compatible trials (Fig. 3). A main effect of compatibility was 
also found in the right inferior occipital cortex (x, y, z = 33, –87, –3, Z = 4.96). The reverse 
contrast (stronger activation in incompatible than compatible trials) revealed activations in 
the insular cortex, bilaterally (left: x, y, z = 42, 21, –3, Z = 4.46; right: –33, 18, 3, Z = 4.34) 
and in the fusiform gyrus.  The insula activation survived FDR correction for multiple 
comparisons (P < 0.05), while the fusiform activation did not. These results are consistent 
with studies showing that subliminally induced response conflicts do not recruit areas 
traditionally associated with explicit conflict, such as the anterior cingulate (Dehaene et al., 
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2003; Chambon et al., 2013; but see also Teuchies et al., 2016). Finally, the main effect of 
group did not reveal any significant clusters.  The interaction between group and 
compatibility revealed a single significant cluster in the left precentral gyrus (x, y, z = –21, –
21, 63, Z = 3.81), which did not survive correction for multiple comparisons 
(Supplementary Information, Supplementary Table S1). 
In the free-choice condition, similar analyses showed a main effect of compatibility 
in bilateral rostral prefrontal cortex (PFC). Specifically, compatible trials elicited stronger 
activations in superior parts of left (x, y, z = –15, 49, 43, Z = 4.97) and right rostral PFC (x, y, 
z = 18, 50, 42, Z = 4.57) relative to incompatible trials (Fig. 3). Incompatible trials, relative 
to compatible trials, elicited a stronger activation in the inferior orbito-frontal cortex (x, y, z = 
27, 36, –9, Z = 3.48) while both the main effect of group and the interaction between group 
and compatibility elicited activations in the medial part of the PFC (e.g., x, y, z = 12, 51, 33, 
Z = 3.55), although none of these activations survived FDR correction (Supplementary 
Information, Supplementary Table S1). 
 
<< Insert Fig. 3 about here >> 
 
Interaction between action selection and sense of control 
In both cued and free trials, we identified regions whose activation at the time of action 
selection, was differentially modulated by levels of experienced control (low, medium, high 
tertiles of each participant’s subjective rating) according to the condition of action selection 
(compatible, incompatible).  These were identified using a parametric contrast of {compatible 
×  control} versus {incompatible ×  control}, or {incompatible ×  control} versus 
{compatible ×  control}, respectively.  
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In the cued-choice condition, a main effect of compatibility was found in the left 
angular gyrus (AG). Specifically, left AG (–44, –62, 46, Z = 3.16) was modulated by 
subjective level of control (low > medium > high) in incompatible but not compatible trials. 
AG activation did not vary significantly with control on compatible trials. We did not find 
any regions whose activity increased with greater control (high > medium > low) in 
incompatible trials, even with a very liberal threshold of p < 0.05 uncorrected, extent 
threshold 10 voxels.  
Critically, this modulation of AG activity was significantly stronger in healthy 
volunteers than in patients, as revealed by a significant group × compatibility interaction 
effect in left AG (x, y, z = –42, –60, 43, Z = 3.81) and, to a lesser extent, right AG (x, y, z = 
48, –53, 45, Z = 3.51) clusters. Thus, on incompatible trials, AG activity decreased with 
increased control in healthy volunteers, while no such modulation of activity was observed in 
patients (Fig. 4, and Supplementary Table S2).  
 
<< Insert Fig. 4 about here >> 
 
In the free-choice condition, the group × compatibility interaction was significant in 
the right AG only (x, y, z = 44, –51, 37, Z = 3.93). Again, incompatible trials triggered a 
significant decrease in AG activity as a function of increased control in healthy volunteers but 
not in patients with schizophrenia (Fig. 5). Voxels in the right dlPFC (x, y, z = 46, 20, 23, Z = 
2.88) also responded to the group × compatibility interaction, but the cluster was far from 
significance (P > 0.05) (Supplementary Information, Supplementary Table S2). In free-
choice trials, the main effect of compatibility did not reveal any significant clusters. Finally, 
the left precentral gyrus was found to be more strongly activated in patients than in healthy 
volunteers, though this result again did not survive the cluster-level threshold of P < 0.05.  
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<< Insert Fig. 5 about here >> 
 
Functional connectivity (PPI)  
We also performed connectivity analyses (PPI) to investigate how mismatch-related coding 
of agency by AG, and the resulting subjective sense of control, might depend on action 
selection fluency. Seed voxels were placed in AG regions showing responses related to 
subjective control, in cued and free choice respectively (see above). PPI analyses were 
performed separately in both groups (see Supplementary methods, “Functional connectivity 
analyses procedure”, for details). We then compared healthy volunteers and patients with 
schizophrenia directly by contrasting slope coefficients computed from the PPI in each group 
using a 2 × 2 ANOVA with compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) as a within-subjects 
factor, and group (healthy volunteers vs. patients) as a between-subjects factor. 
In cued-choice trials, the altered action selection caused by prime-target 
incompatibility triggered a change in the pattern of fronto-parietal interactions in healthy 
volunteers, but not in patients with schizophrenia. Specifically, in healthy volunteers, 
incompatible trials induced a significant increase in functional connectivity between left AG 
and left dlPFC, and between right AG and right dlPFC.  Greater activation in left and right 
DLPFC was associated with lower activation in left and right AG, respectively (left dlPFC, 
local maximum at –48, 30, 30, T = 3.89, p < 0.005; right dlPFC, local maximum at 36, 42, 33, 
T = 4.25, p < 0.001). No such coupling between AG and dlPFC regions was observed in 
patients. Finally, comparing slope coefficients between groups confirmed that context-
dependent changes (i.e., changes depending on compatibility of action selection) in coupling 
between AG and dlPFC were significantly stronger in healthy volunteers than in patients with 
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schizophrenia (left AG-dlPFC coupling: F(1,13) =13.3, p = 0.003; right AG-dlPFC coupling: 
F(1,13) =10.41, p = 0.006) (Fig. 6). 
 
<< Insert Fig. 6 about here >> 
 
In free-choice trials, we found a similar pattern of results, but now involving the 
medial rather than lateral prefrontal cortex (see below).  In healthy volunteers, incompatible 
trials again triggered a significant increase in functional connectivity between right AG and 
the superior part of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), with greater activation in mPFC 
being associated with lower activation in right AG (mPFC, local maximum at –3, 46, 51, T = 
4.01, p < 0.001). Note the mPFC activation found in the PPI is located just between the two 
rostral PFC clusters found in objective action selection contrasts (see above, Fig. 3, right 
panel). Again, no such coupling between AG and mPFC regions was observed in patients. 
Finally, comparing slope coefficients between groups confirmed that context-dependent 
changes in coupling between AG and mPFC were significantly stronger in healthy volunteers 
than in patients (right AG-mPFC coupling: F(1,13) =6.96, p = 0.02).  
 
To recap, our behavioural results suggest a novel dissociation between two levels of 
action representation in schizophrenia: objective motor performance is spared, while the 
patients show specific deficits for the subjective, metacognitive experience of agency. 
Importantly, the fMRI findings showed that activity and connectivity in a well-established 
cortical agency network closely mirrored this behavioural dissociation. Thus, we found a 
main effect of compatibility for both cued (dlPFC) and free (rPFC) choice conditions during 
action selection, but no group effect, suggesting spared action selection processing in the 
patients group. However, we also found reduced modulation of the AG activity by agency 
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ratings in patients compared to healthy volunteers, suggesting impaired metacognitive 
abilities in individuals with schizophrenia. Further, connectivity analyses revealed abnormal 
information transfer between selection (PFC) and metacognitive (AG) areas in patients with 
schizophrenia, suggesting that failure of AG to code prospective agency may be due to 
reduced connectivity with frontal action generation areas. 
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Discussion 
We used subliminal arrow primes to influence the fluency/dysfluency of action selection. As 
expected, priming influenced both reaction times, and free choices. To investigate the sense 
of agency, we obtained subjective ratings of control over visual stimuli that followed each 
action. Importantly, neither primes nor responses alone could predict the colours shown as 
action outcomes. Instead, compatible primes facilitated, and/or incompatible primes 
impaired, action selection processing (cf. Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon et al., 2013; 
Chambon et al., 2014a, 2014b). Since the primes themselves were not consciously perceived, 
yet clearly influenced both action selection processing and sense of agency over outcomes, 
we suggest our result reflect a prospective aspect of sense of agency. Thus, sense of agency 
may depend on premotor processing before the action, in addition to previously-investigated 
comparisons between predicted and actual outcomes. Importantly, individuals with 
schizophrenia showed the same effects of subliminal priming on motor performance, but 
showed reduced, and even reversed effects of these primes on sense of agency. This finding 
argues that the subjective feeling of control over action outcomes can be dissociated from 
motor performance. 
Neuroimaging results showed that, for healthy volunteers, the prospective sense of 
agency was associated with activation of the angular gyrus (AG). Interestingly, stronger AG 
activations were associated with lower ratings of control, suggesting coding for non-agency, 
rather than for positive agency. The direction of this effect recalls previous experiments 
involving action attribution judgements, in which AG activation was linked to non-self or/and 
non-agency, rather than self-recognition or positive agency (Farrer et al., 2002; Farrer et al., 
2008). Moreover, there was a distinctive pattern of connectivity between the angular gyrus 
and frontal action selection areas, which further depended both on prime compatibility. 
Individuals with schizophrenia showed normal activation of frontal action selection areas.  
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However, crucially, the patients did not show the connectivity of these areas with the angular 
gyrus, nor the relation between angular gyrus BOLD response and prospective agency. 
 
Parietal monitoring of multiple frontal signals relating to action selection 
To our knowledge, this is the first neuroimaging study to combine prospective sense of 
agency for two distinct action selection processes, namely cued and free choices. Classically, 
a lateral frontal route selects responses to external stimuli, while a medial frontal route selects 
and generates voluntary actions (e.g., Passingham et al., 2010). We used event-related fMRI 
to identify brain areas in which selection of cued and free responses was influenced by 
subliminal priming. The results were broadly consistent with a traditional distinction between 
externally-triggered and internally-generated routes to action. Incompatible priming for cued 
choices deactivated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in each hemisphere, relative to 
compatible priming. In contrast, incompatible priming for free choices deactivated a rostral 
and more medial prefrontal area, again bilaterally. Thus, subliminal priming influenced two 
classically different routes to action, by modulating activation of whichever frontal regions 
were engaged in that trial. In each case, activation of the frontal action selection area was 
reduced under conditions when selection would be dysfluent or difficult. Activation of these 
areas may therefore reflect the ease of extracting the intended action from a response space 
(Frith, 2000; Passingham, Rowe, et al., 2004; Barbalat et al., 2009)  
 Free and cued choice trials were randomised in our design, so switching between these 
two different circuits for action selection cannot reflect a strategic or preparatory process, but 
must rather be driven by the cue/mask stimulus occurring on each trial. Interestingly, 
subliminal primes were presented prior to the target/mask, yet influenced subsequent 
processing in whichever action selection circuit was engaged by the target/mask, i.e., for 
either cued or free-choices. This suggests that subliminal priming provided an initial bias 
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favouring one action representation, but that this representation contributed to circuits for 
both cued and endogenous action selection. Subliminal primes affected the selection process 
in a similar way in both cases, and had similar effects on a common metacognitive 
monitoring circuit responsible for control ratings. These results show that selection processes 
implemented in multiple frontal circuits for action generation both contribute to prospective 
agency. Crucially, we found that this prospective contribution of action selection processes 
was associated with exchange of signals between specific, source-appropriate frontal areas 
and the AG, at least in healthy volunteers.  
The angular gyrus is widely held to underpin the sense of agency (Farrer et al., 2004; 
Farrer et al., 2008; Nahab et al., 2011; Chambon et al., 2013; Chambon et al., 2015). As in 
other studies, we found that this coding was clearly negative: stronger activation of AG 
bilaterally was correlated with a reduced experience of agency. Importantly, this correlation 
captured a prospective, rather than a retrospective, component of agency, because it was 
based on a regressor for action selection, rather than action outcome. Variations in the AG 
BOLD response at the time of action selection predicted subjects’ later judgements of control 
in the task, replicating our previous study (Chambon et al., 2013). Most previous 
neuroimaging studies of sense of agency focussed on retrospective attribution of perceptual 
events to one’s own action, or to another agent. These studies reported AG activations when 
the actual outcomes did not match predicted outcome (e.g., Farrer et al., 2008) and 
disturbances of such signalling in AG in patients suffering from schizophrenia (Farrer et al., 
2004). In our study, in contrast, the AG coded for the mismatch between a prime and 
subsequent target, or subsequent action. The circuitry for monitoring and detecting such 
premotor mismatches may be comparable to that for detecting mismatch between predicted 
and actual outcomes. Thus, the involvement of AG in monitoring mismatch between signals 
may be a general feature common to both prospective and retrospective agency processing. 
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AG could act as a putative metacognitive hub, monitoring signals generated by a range of 
different cognitive processes.  This general metacognitive monitoring function might explain 
the wide range of tasks in which AG activation is found (Seghier, 2013). 
 
We used connectivity analyses to investigate how subliminal priming might influence 
the relation between the prefrontal regions involved in action selection and the AG 
monitoring circuit. PPI analyses showed that communication between frontal and parietal 
areas depended strongly on internal premotor signals generated during action selection. 
Specifically, incompatible priming leads to changes in functional connectivity between 
prefrontal cortex and AG. In contrast, compatible priming appeared to represent a default 
situation: we found no additional change in coupling between prefrontal cortex and AG.  This 
does not imply effective disconnection in the compatible condition. Rather, we suggest that 
prefrontal and parietal areas communicate continuously and by default, but that this 
communication is transiently increased under conditions of mismatch between competing 
intentions at the time of action selection, as occurs in incompatible priming. 
 
Dissociation between motor performance and sense of control in schizophrenia  
We found a striking dissociation between action selection processing and action selection 
monitoring in individuals with schizophrenia. Subliminal priming influenced patients’ 
actions, in the same way as for healthy volunteers.  Moreover, these behavioural effects were 
mediated by the same brain activations as in volunteers, namely dorsolateral and rostral 
prefrontal areas for cued and free-choice respectively. Thus, action selection processing in 
our patients appeared normal. However the subjective experience of agency that these frontal 
circuits produced was profoundly altered. We found no effects of subliminal priming on 
subjective sense of agency in the patient group. That is, the patients appeared not to monitor 
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prime-induced premotor dysfluency signals, and did not use such signals to prospectively 
inform their feeling of control over action outcomes. Crucially, this deficit was not due to 
absence of such premotor signals – since primes had significant effects on the patients’ motor 
response latencies.  Instead, the deficit lay in a specific additional process of monitoring 
premotor signals for purposes of constructing action awareness. That is, our data showed a 
stark dissociation between intact action selection, and deficient metacognitive monitoring of 
internal action selection processes. Further, our control ratings showed that normal sense of 
agency over action outcomes partly depends on such metacognitive monitoring (Metcalfe, 
2009). 
We found a clear correlation between AG activation and prospective sense of control 
in our healthy volunteers. Consistently, the absence of any prospective sense of control in the 
patients was accompanied by absence of any agency coding in AG. Specifically, the patients’ 
different levels of experienced control were unrelated to AG activation in both compatible 
and incompatible priming conditions. This was not due to lack of variation in experienced 
control, since variability across trials in control ratings was comparable in the two groups. 
We speculate that patients may rely not on prospective action selection to establish a sense of 
control, but instead rely largely on occurrence of action outcomes. In previous studies, the 
low-level temporal experience of agency was driven largely prospectively, by predictions 
about likely outcomes, in healthy volunteers, but largely retrospectively, by actual occurrence 
of outcomes, in individuals suffering from schizophrenia and its prodromal stages (Voss et 
al., 2010; Hauser et al., 2010).  The methods in this study cannot conclusively show what 
signals individuals with schizophrenia used in making agency judgements. However, we 
observed that patients’ control ratings were more strongly driven by variations in action-
effect interval, compared to those of healthy volunteers. Patients may compensate for a 
deficit in prospective signals by relying instead on outcome-related signals, such as temporal 
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contiguity of outcome and action. Because the action-effect interval is unpredictable, this 
temporal information can only be available retrospectively, after the outcome has occurred. In 
summary, individuals with schizophrenia experience varying levels of sense of control, but 
the sources of this experience are affected by the disease, and show a different balance 
between prospective and retrospective signals, compared to healthy volunteers. Importantly, 
action-effect intervals were uniformly distributed across compatible and incompatible trials. 
Hence, the action-effect interval was orthogonal to the effect of compatibility on control 
ratings, although the former was significantly stronger than the latter. Interestingly, however, 
analysis of control ratings showed that the interaction between group and compatibility 
produced an effect size comparable to the interaction between group and action-effect 
interval. The schizophrenic deficit in use of prospective cues was approximately balanced by 
their augmented use of retrospective cues. Thus, our findings converge with those of a 
previous study using a different task, and different agency measures (Voss et al., 2010; 
Synofzik et al., 2010).  
 
Altered connectivity underlies deficits in monitoring action selection signals 
Modulation of prefrontal-AG connectivity by incompatible priming was entirely absent in 
patients. Prime-induced intentions did influence the patients’ prefrontal action selection 
process, but did not propagate to the AG monitoring circuit. Specifically, PPI using our 
action selection regressor did not identify any change in lateral prefrontal connectivity with 
AG in cued choice, or in rostral prefrontal cortex in free choice. This failure to modulate 
inter-areal communication may explain the lack of any relation between AG activation and 
sense of control in the patient group. On this basis, we suggest that the deficit in AG coding 
in schizophrenia is not primarily anatomical, but rather reflects impaired communication 
between the disparate set of areas recruited for the current task. In this sense, our data are 
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consistent with functional disconnection hypotheses of schizophrenia (e.g., Friston, 1998; 
Barbalat et al., 2011). 
In the healthy brain, internal prospective signals may protect us from being surprised 
by our own actions, and may underlie the feeling of voluntary control (Chambon and 
Haggard, 2012). We have shown a mechanistic basis in the brain for these internal signals, 
for both instructed and endogenous action choices, and we have identified the neural circuit 
that monitors these signals to generate a sense of agency. Most importantly, we have shown 
that these prospective internal signals are also present in the prefrontal cortex of the brain in 
individuals suffering from schizophrenia, but that they are not successfully communicated to 
and monitored by the parietal cortex. 
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Table  
 
Table 1. Clinical and demographic characteristics (mean ± S.D.) 
Characteristic 
Individuals with 
schizophrenia 
(n=16) 
Comparison 
participants (n=16) P value 
Male sex, No. (%) 11 (68,75) 13 (81,25) 0.42 
Age, y 32.9 (6.25) 29.9 (6.6) 0.13 
SPQ score 30.9 (13.7) 11.5 (10.9) < 0.001 
BACS score 41.4 (5) 41.9 (3.2) 0.68 
MWT-B score 29.2 (3.5) 29.9 (5) 0.76 
Duration of illness, y 8.07 (4.59) - - 
SANS score 23.42 (14.08) - - 
SAPS score 21.6 (19.9) - - 
Ego-disturbance scorea 6.1 (4) - - 
Reality distortion scoreb 9.2 (11) - - 
Psychomotor poverty scorec 15 (11.4) - - 
Disorganisation scored 7.8 (8.8) - - 
Haloperidol equivalente, 
mg/d 3.4 (2.54) - - 
 
Abbreviations: SPQ, Scale for Assessment of Schizotypal Personality; BACS, Brief Assessment of 
Cognition in Schizophrenia; MWT-B, Multiple-choice word test; SANS, Scale for the Assessment of 
Negative Symptoms; SAPS, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. 
a Sum of the following subscores from the SAPS: delusions of mind reading, thought broadcasting, 
thought insertion, thought withdrawal, somatic delusions, delusions of being controlled, ideas and 
delusions of reference. 
b Sum of the scores for hallucinations and delusions from SAPS. 
c Sum of the scores for poverty of speech, flat affect, and anhedonia/asociality, from the SANS. 
d Sum of the scores for formal thought disorder and bizarre behavior from the SAPS, and the scores 
for alogia and inappropriate affect from the SANS (Hardy-Bayle et al., 2003). 
e Depot doses and daily oral atypical antipsychotic drugs at the time of the examination were 
converted to average daily haloperidol-equivalent doses (Andreasen et al., 2010).  
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Figure legends  
 
Figure 1. Schematic of trial procedure and stimuli. Example trials showing different 
combinations of the prime-action compatibility in the cued-choice (left and middle) and the 
free-choice (right) condition. Participants were instructed to respond to the target stimuli and 
were not informed of the presence of the arrow primes. Primes and masks could appear 
randomly above or below fixation on each trial. The appearance of the effect was randomly 
jittered 100, 400, or 700 ms after the keypress to increase the range of judgements of 
perceived control. After a jittered delay varying from 3 to 5 s, participants were asked to 
estimate how much control they felt they had over the action effect. Control ratings at the 
time of judgment were used as modulators of brain activity at the time of action selection. 
In the three example trials shown, the participant always makes a left hand response. 
Therefore, in the free choice trial shown, the response is incompatible with the leftward 
prime.  
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Figure 2. Action-effect experiment. Mean control ratings on compatible and incompatible 
trials, for cued and free choice, and for healthy volunteers and patients. All error bars indicate 
standard deviation. *: p < .05. **: p < .01. 
 
Figure 3. Action-selection regressor: sagittal and axial sections showing brain 
activations for the main effect of compatibility. Left panel, cued-choice condition: 
significant clusters were found in dlPFC, bilaterally. Right panel, free-choice condition: 
significant clusters were found in rostral PFC, bilaterally. Colour bar indicates t-statistic 
value. Images are presented at a whole-brain threshold of P(false discovery rate) < 0.05, k > 
10. A = Anterior. 
 
Figure 4. Parametric modulation of angular gyrus activation during action selection by 
subjective control ratings on cued-choice trials. Results are shown for each combination 
of group and compatibility. Left and right AG are differentially modulated by control 
ratings (low, medium, and high) of healthy volunteers, but not patients, participants, 
depending on how fluent action selection is. A = Anterior. AG = angular gyrus. 
 
Figure 5. Parametric modulation of angular gyrus activation during action selection by 
subjective control ratings on free-choice trials. Results are shown for each combination 
of group and compatibility. The right AG is differentially modulated by control ratings 
(low, medium, and high) of healthy volunteers, but not patients, depending on how fluent 
action selection is. A = Anterior; P = Posterior. AG = angular gyrus. 
 
Figure 6. PPI of AG and DLPFC for a single subject in cued-choice trials. Prime-target 
incompatibility induced a significant increase in functional connectivity between AG and 
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dlPFC bilaterally, in healthy volunteers (middle panels), but not in patients (right panels), 
participants. Measurements during the INCOMPATIBLE condition: black dots; 
measurements during the COMPATIBLE condition: grey crosses. Top row: mean-corrected 
BOLD activity in left DLPFC (peak MNI coordinates, –48, 30, 30) is displayed as a function 
of mean-corrected BOLD activity in left AG (–42, –60, 43). Bottom row: mean-corrected 
BOLD activity in right DLPFC (peak MNI coordinates, 36, 42, 33) is displayed as a function 
of mean-corrected BOLD activity in right AG (48, –53, 45). The difference between 
regression slopes for the incompatible (bi) and compatible (bc) conditions constitutes the PPI. 
In free-choice trials (not shown here), the same pattern of connectivity between right AG and 
mPFC was found in healthy volunteers, but not in patients (see PPI results, main text). 






